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will not come. In place of *ut* we find indeed *quem ad modum* used with the same negative thought underlying. *Haec quem ad modum explicari possint* aut, a tecum explicabuntur, ne impediuntur *timeo* (Brutus in Cic. Fam. XI 10). Cf. Cornific. IV 37, 49: *Dicimus nos timere quomodo accipiant.*

As Prof. Shepherd kindly informs me, such expressions as: Take care *how* you play with it, signifying take care *not* to play with it, are frequently heard in colloquial English.

HENRY R. LANG.

ON THE THEAETETOS OF PLATO.

In this dialogue, 169 D, occurs the following passage: Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβόμεθα οὐπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὁρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περὶ τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφοὺς. The words I propose to notice are καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας; what is their connection with the foregoing clauses, and what (for that seems the point on which everything hinges) is the construction and sense of the dative ἡμῖν?

Campbell, in his second edition of the dialogue, says in his note on these words: "The sentence breaks and reverts to the direct form," adding in a parenthesis, "Others, with Heindorf, 'and whether Protagoras was right in admitting.'" Jowett seems to take Campbell's view, for he renders: "In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although he admitted that there was a better and a worse, and that in respect of this, some, who he said were wise, excelled others." In Hirschig's edition, in the Didot collection, the Latin rendering, which is that of Ficinus corrected, runs: "Idem igitur primum, quod superius, resumamus ac videamus, utrum recte, necne, sermonem illius morose improbaverimus, quo unum quemque ad sapientiam sibimet sufficere dicit, et nobis concessit Protagoras, in eo quod melius vel deterius inter se quosdam differre, quos etiam esse sapientes."

In the rendering of Ficinus the words in question seem to be connected with the clause ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει: this

is unquestionably wrong. To take them as a reversion to direct or independent construction seems to me unnecessary, and, as unnecessary, therefore wrong. The connection as given by "Heindorf and others" is to my mind the only correct one; but his rendering I cannot accept. In all the above given explanations of the passage ἡμῶν is made to depend on ξυνεχώρησεν (or if not, it has been passed over and no adequate force given to it); whereas it has no dependence upon this verb whatever.

But it will be well, before going any further, to consider what it is that had been previously said and is now to be examined anew. Theaitetos had defined knowledge to be sensation; this definition Sokrates had shown to be equivalent to the dictum of Protagoras, "man is the measure," or in other words, that "what appears to a man is to him." This dictum was then attacked. If it be correct, is not each man quite as wise as any of his fellows? Nay, does it not apply equally well to all percipient beings? Is Protagoras then any wiser than an animal, and is not Theaitetos as wise as any god? If, again, knowledge is sensation, a man knows when he sees, but not when he remembers. As, too, he may at once see and not see, when he has one eye open and the other shut, he may at once know and not know the same thing; he may know it, too, dimly and clearly, near and far off, etc., just as he may see it in these various ways. It is then asked, 'What reply would Protagoras make to all this?' Theaitetos being completely staggered by the objections offered, and Theodoros shrinking from a dialectic encounter with Sokrates, the latter finds himself forced to assume the defence of Protagoras and to speak in his name. Protagoras would say: Your objections may frighten children, but not men like me. I admit all this that you say about knowing; it does not in the least affect the facts of my theory. A man's recollection of a sensation is quite a different thing from the sensation itself. Your previous statement that my theory would make all men equally wise is faulty. To the sick man sweet may taste bitter, and it is bitter to him. But the physician comes to him, puts him in a sound condition by means of medicines, and henceforth sweet is sweet to him. So a man is in bad condition mentally, and his perception of what is right is influenced by that condition; yet what seems to him right is for him right. This man falls into the hands of the sophist, and by argument is bettered in his mental condition, and his perception of the right is bettered accordingly. There is, then, a difference in men, as between the wiser and the

less wise ; but it is a difference, not in the truth of their perceptions, but in their mental condition, which affects their perceptions, as sickness and health are well known to do. This is Sokrates' conception of the defence Protagoras would make, if he were alive and present.

Again, let us look at what Sokrates says immediately after the passage under discussion. ' If he had been present in person and had made this admission instead of our making it for him, there would be no need to resume the argument and confirm it ; but as matters stand, it may be objected that we have exceeded our powers in making such admissions in his defence.'

Now, in the light of these passages, is it not clear that what was to be looked into was not whether Protagoras was right or wrong in making certain admissions (still less was it to be taken for granted that he had made them), but whether Sokrates was right or wrong in supposing he would make them ? The connection of the clause is then that given by Heindorf ; but ἡμῖν, instead of depending on *ξυνεχώρησεν*, is the indefinite dative of the person interested in the statement *ξυνεχώρησεν κ. τ. λ.* ; the person 'to whose mind a thing is so,' 'according to whose belief, or words, a thing is so,' etc. The sense of the passage then is : ' Let us see whether we were right or wrong in blaming and taking offence at the dictum, on the ground that it made each man self-sufficient as regards wisdom, and whether we were right or wrong in supposing Protagoras to admit a difference of better and worse in men, and in this respect the superiority of some who he said were wise.'

For the use of *συγχωρέω* without a dative and with the accusative and infinitive, cf. Rep. 6, 489 D : *καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν*. For the dative, cf. Theait. 154 E : *πρῶτον βουλευσόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν*, ' Let us see by comparing them together what our notions really are, whether they seem to us to agree with one another or not at all.' Theait. 166 A : *ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθέν εἰδεν*, ' When he had found a child who was terrified by the question.' Theait. 175 B : *Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὃ φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ* *Τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ ;* ' Yes, but when, my friend, he has raised a man to a higher plane and has induced him to abandon such questions as, What wrong have I done you or you me ?' Soph. 237 A : *Παρμείδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὃ παῖ, παισὶν μὲν ἡμῖν οὖσιν, ἀρχόμενος δὲ καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο*, ' It was in our boyhood, my son, that we heard the great Parmenides

bearing this testimony, which from first to last he never ceased to bear.' Of course, as Sokrates was then a boy, this testimony was not addressed to him; he happened to hear it; that was all. Rep. I, 343 A: "Ὅτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γινώσκεις, 'Since she leaves you in ignorance of what is a sheep and what is a shepherd.'

W. A. LAMBERTON.